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Why is Democracy Elusive in the Middle East?
Jeannie Sowers
Department of Political Science

I

n the aftermath of 9/11, discussions about counterterrorism quickly veered into broader concerns
about the absence of democracy in the Middle East
as a “root cause” of terrorist movements. The Bush
Administration made “democratizing” the region by
force one of the key justifications for pre-emptive war in
Iraq, despite the fact that most regional analysts argued
that a prolonged American occupation of Iraq would
reduce prospects for democracy.
This has indeed been the case. The war in Iraq now
has regional repercussions that rival those of the IsraeliPalestinian-Arab conflict. For instance, Iraqis now constitute the second largest refugee population in the Middle East after the Palestinians. Over two million Iraqis,
as well as many Palestinian refugees who settled in Iraq,
have fled to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. These
countries, with scarce resources, are tightening controls
on refugees, who are leaving Iraq at an estimated rate
of several thousand per day. Over two million Iraqis are
internally displaced and unable to leave.1
In addition, U.S. pressure on such different regimes
as Egypt and Saudi Arabia to pursue political reforms
has evaporated as the Iraqi situation deteriorates. These
governments have employed new restrictive laws and
simple coercion to limit the activities of both secular
and Islamist opponents. As chaos spreads in Iraq, the
growing clout of Iran and the U.S.’s disengagement from
the Arab-Israeli peace process have further destabilized
the region.
In this context, official American rhetoric about
promoting democracy comes across to most Middle
Easterners as insincere at best and callous at worst, even
though many in the Middle East openly admire the
American people and American democratic institutions. Public opinion polls consistently show that significant majorities of Middle Easterners favor democratic
government for their own countries.

For more information on the Iraqi refugee crisis, see reports by Human
Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) and the International Crisis Group
(www.icg.org).
1

A Comparative Politics Approach

So why, the recent and tragic developments aside, has
democratization thus far eluded the region? Scholars
of comparative politics sometimes approach the problem of democratization by breaking it down into more
bounded questions and seeking common patterns
across a range of cases. How do authoritarian regimes
come to power and manage to stay there? What roles
do civil society or external actors play in challenging
authoritarian rule?
In answering such questions, we find that we can explain the scarcity of democracy in the Middle East without resorting to the idea that the Middle East is somehow inherently resistant to democracy. It is misleading,
in my view, to argue that Arab political culture or Islam
are unchanging or inherently undemocratic. Instead, if
we look at both past and present trends, we find longstanding patterns of external intervention, weak parliaments and strong executives, and a variety of popular
movements that have advocated more representative,
accountable government.

Colonial Rule and Weak Democratic
Institutions

The Middle East has been subject to unusually significant levels of external intervention. The central political
drama of the late 19th century and the first half of the
20th century in the Middle East was the emergence of
movements for “constitutionalism” and against external
rule. Reformers in the Ottoman Empire, North Africa,
and Iran wanted to create popularly elected parliaments
and adopt a written constitution to constrain the power
of the ruler. Despite these desires, from the early 1800’s
until the 1950’s, the region was the object of virtually
continuous attempts at direct and indirect control by
European powers. At different times, the British controlled Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and Palestine; the French
ruled with varying degrees of success in Lebanon, Syria,
Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria; the Italians decimated
much of the domestic population of Libya, and the
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Russians and British played for influence in Iran—much
as they did further a field in Central Asia.
External powers faced periodic, popular revolts
against the colonial presence, and all used violence and
co-optation of local elites to sustain their position. They
also established monarchies or presidential systems
with deliberately weak parliaments, as was the case in
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Egypt. Colonial powers and local rulers alike sought to limit the effectiveness and scope of parliamentary authority.
In addition, early Middle Eastern states were poor.
Great differences in wealth and power divided society
into relatively small numbers of elites and much greater
numbers of poorer people. These popular classes increasingly joined in formal political life in the 1930’s
and 1940’s through the creation of mass-based movements that called for an end to colonial rule and for
more authentic and representative governments.
Middle Easterners marched in the streets, organized
political parties of all sorts, voted in elections where
given the chance, and waged insurgencies when no political outlets emerged. Many were imprisoned,
executed, and exiled in the process.
Colonial advisers and local rulers, concerned with
controlling vast rural hinterlands and unruly cities,
strengthened the armed forces and established new
internal security forces. These came to occupy a privileged place within national economies and political life.
In Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the small Gulf
states, monarchs succeeded in creating family dynasties despite recurrent opposition. Elsewhere, in Egypt,
Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Tunisia, cliques of army officers
eventually overthrew the colonial orders, perceived by
most citizens as corrupt, ineffectual, and elitist.

The Growth of the State

Many of these army officers were populist—that is, they
appealed to vast numbers of ‘citizens’ who had seemingly gained little under weak parliamentary governments.
They rapidly expanded central state bureaucracies to
consolidate control and enact ambitious plans for stateled development. They centralized the apparatus of the
state in the capital city and around the institution of the
president or monarch himself. Many leaders also cultivated support among the poorer segments of society by
undertaking programs of land redistribution, expanding educational opportunities, and creating jobs in the
growing public bureaucracies.

Some emerging Middle Eastern states could draw
on revenues from oil and foreign military aid to consolidate their political systems. In Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and small states of the Gulf, the nationalization of oil
companies channeled increasingly large sums of money
directly into the coffers of incumbent governments and
families. (Nationalization of oil production was widely
popular, as previously the vast majority of oil profits
went to a cartel of foreign multinationals). Other countries, such as Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Iran, were able
to maneuver throughout the Cold War between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union to obtain significant influxes of
military hardware and economic aid, disproportionate to the size of their economies or their populations.
The U.S. continues to arm Saudi Arabia, the small Gulf
states, Israel, and Egypt by arranging for billions in
subsidized loans that, in most cases, must be used to
purchase U.S. military equipment.

Downsizing the State, Manipulating
Politics

Over the last few decades, authoritarian rulers have
faced greater challenges in maintaining their monopolies over political power. Since the 1970’s, states have
found they can no longer provide enough jobs, educational opportunities, and basic services to still rapidly
increasing populations. Regimes both democratic and
authoritarian have downsized and privatized. This
process, still underway, is producing an increasingly
diversified and vibrant private sector and increasing
economic inequality as old forms of state support for
the poor are withdrawn. Regimes have also experimented with new forms of political control, allowing small
numbers of officially sanctioned parties to contest elections. Many of these elections are rigged or otherwise
manipulated to ensure that the government’s favored
party maintains majorities in parliament and in other
institutions such as professional associations and clubs.

The Islamist Trend

Some of the most successful movements in contesting
even rigged elections, have been groups and organizations that define themselves as part of a broader Islamic
resurgence. Islamist movements and networks have
benefited from the failures of state elites to provide basic services, address corruption, and safeguard human
rights. Sa’ad Eddin Ibrahim, a respected academic and
secular democratic activist in Egypt who was recently
released after several years in Egyptian jails, echoed the
consensus of many analysts within the region when he
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wrote recently that “mainstream Islamists with broad
social support, developed civic dispositions, and services to provide are the most likely actors in building a
new Middle East. Whether we like it or not, these are
the facts.” 2
At the end of the Cold War, hopes that the Middle
East would finally be released from the machinations
of great powers interested in oil and strategic real estate
were short-lived. As suggested at the beginning, the U.S.
“war on terror” has been counterproductive thus far for
democratization prospects in the region. But conditions
in the region are in flux. On a recent trip to Cairo, I
found many Egyptians outspoken and frank about
the incompetence of the ruling party and the system
of presidential patronage that underpins it. Some feel
that change is inevitable. A recent college graduate,
active in the Kifaya (Enough!) movement, told me that
“Democracy is only a matter of time. The only questions
are when and at what price. But it will happen.”

What Can the U.S. Do?

What could the U.S. do to help promote rather than
hinder democratization in the Middle East? The United
States could work diligently to solve regional and civil
conflicts, but only by recognizing the legitimacy of
diverse interests and viewpoints, a task that has eluded
several recent administrations. The United States could
condition its military and economic aid on substantive
political reforms and regional conflict-problem solving,
something that the U.S. has thus far been unwilling to
do except in token and small-scale ways.
As for Iraq, we face dismal options from a misguided
intervention. The U.S. could signal its recognition of the
costs to both Iraqis and the region by addressing the
mounting humanitarian crisis in concrete and visible
ways. For instance, on the refugee question alone, the
U.S. could dramatically increase its assistance to such
organizations as the United Nations Refugee Agency
(UNHCR) and accept large numbers of Iraqi refugees
rather than the token hundreds that have so far been
admitted.

Interested in learning more?
At UNH:

• Courses on the Middle East and/or Islam are taught
by Alasdair Drysdale (Geography), Ethel Sara Wolper
(History) and myself (Political Science), among
others.
• Arabic is currently being offered through the
Languages, Literatures, and Cultures Department.

On the Internet:

• For up-to-date analysis of developments based on research in the field, check out the Middle East
Research and Information Project (www.merip.org)
and the periodic reports by the International Crisis
Group (www.icg.org).
• For information on U.S. foreign policy and foreign
aid, check out the bipartisan reports by the Congressional Research Service. Although supposedly
restricted to members of Congress, most find their
way online. The reference desk at Diamond Library
can also help locate them.
• There are many English-language newspapers and
news outlets from the Middle East on the web. Here
are some of the major ones. (I am not endorsing any
of the content.)
Al Ahram Weekly (Egypt, English),
www.weekly.ahram.org.eg
Al Jazeera, English edition, english.aljazeera.net
Arab News (Saudi Arabia, English),
www.arabnews.com
The Daily Star (Egypt edition, English),
www.dailystaregypt.com
The Daily Star (Lebanon, English),
www.dailystar.com.lb
Haaretz (Israel, English), www.haaretzdaily.com
• Blogs: Blogging is taking off and authoritarian
governments take it seriously. Egypt, for instance,
recently imprisoned several young bloggers on
charges of “defaming the state.” These can be found
through major search engines.

Quoted in “Democratizing the Middle East?” Occasional Paper No. 2, The
Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Tufts University. Report of a
conference held at Tufts University, Medford/Somerville, MA, January 26–27,
2006.
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